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Abstract 
Claims have been made that microfinance institutions (MFIs) experience mission drift as they 
increasingly cater to customers who are better off than their original customers. We investigate 
mission drift using average loan size as a main proxy and the MFI’s lending methodology, main 
market, and gender bias as further mission drift measures. We employ a large data set of rated, 
multi-country MFIs spanning 11 years, and perform panel data estimations with instruments. 
We find that the average loan size has not increased in the industry as a whole, nor is there a 
tendency towards more individual loans or a higher proportion of lending to urban costumers. 
Regressions show that an increase in average profit and average cost tends to increase average 
loan and the other drift measures. More focus should be given to cost efficiency in the MFI. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The microfinance industry is coming of age, and with its maturation have come claims that the 
industry is abandoning its mission to serve the poor (Dichter and Harper, 2007). According to 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, clients who are financially better off crowd out 
poorer clients in any credit scheme (Christen and Drake, 2002 p. 10). The mission of all 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) is to provide banking services to the poor, that is, to lend very 
small sums to very poor borrowers. The objectives of this paper are first to determine the extent 
of mission drift, and second, to provide explanations for why mission drift does or does not 
occur. 
Financial viability is a major concern for the industry. A recent survey conducted by the 
MicroBanking Bulletin (autumn 2007) based on the THEMIX 2006 benchmark data set of 704 
MFIs reveals that 41% are not financially self-sustainable; they rely on donor support to keep 
afloat. However, in pursuing financial objectives, there is the risk of losing sight of social 
objectives. Ever since PRODEM, a Bolivian non-governmental MFI, was commercialized and 
transformed into the shareholder-owned Banco Sol in 1992, addressing the risk of mission drift 
has been high on the industry’s agenda (Rhyne, 1998). Recent events, such as the initial public 
offering of Banco Compartamos in Mexico that led to a handful of people making a USD 450 
million fortune, have added steam to the debate (Rosenberg, 2007). 
Thus, some critics fear that MFIs become too focused on making profits at the expense of 
outreach to poorer customers. The argument is that higher profits lead to lower outreach. 
However, Rhyne (1998) and Christen and Drake (2002) conjecture that a more commercialized 
microfinance industry is better able to serve the poorest members of the community, since their 
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profit motives lead them to be more efficient and more willing to seek out new markets for their 
loan products. The implication is that when we seek explanations for mission drift, we should 
focus upon the MFI’s costs as well as its profits. In this paper, we address these issues in the 
framework of a bank’s profit function freixasrochet2008, where we also include the MFI’s risk. 
Preliminary empirical evidence supports the Rhyne (1998) and Christen and Drake (2002) 
position. Hishigsuren (2007) thoroughly analyzes one MFI in Bangladesh using archival, 
survey, and interview data from different stakeholders. This important case study concludes 
that the MFI shows no statistically significant mission drift when measured by depth, quality, 
and scope of outreach to poor clients, at the same time that the MFI is able to achieve greater 
cost efficiency. In country studies, Paxton et al. (2000) argue that there is a trade-off between 
serving the poorest segments and being financially viable, since transaction costs associated 
with smaller loans are high when compared to those associated with larger loans. However, in a 
study of commercialized and transformed MFIs in Latin America, Christen (2001) concludes 
that mission drift has not taken place. Littlefield et al. (2003) find that programs that target very 
poor clients perform better than others in terms of cost per borrower, an efficiency indicator that 
neutralizes the effect of smaller loan size. Fernando (2004) analyzes 39 transformed MFIs and 
finds that their financial positions improved significantly and they did not lose sight of their 
mission. Both case and country studies lack generality. Until now, Cull et al. (2007) is the only 
larger cross-country study to address mission drift. Using a sample of 124 MFIs in 49 countries, 
they find that MFIs can stay true to their mission even when they aggressively pursue financial 
goals. Our study differs from theirs in that the data material is larger, we use instruments in 
estimation, and our study is specifically geared towards the mission drift question. 
Woller et al. (1999) and Woller (2002) hold that mission drift occurs when an MFI leaves the 
poor customer segment. We subscribe to this view, to which there seems to be general 
agreement in the microfinance industry. If mission drift occurs, the MFI’s outreach to poor 
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customers, its depth dimension of outreach (Schreiner, 2002), is weakened. Depth outreach 
concerns the MFI’s provision of financial services to the poorest segments, and is first and 
foremost defined as average loan as in Cull et al. (2007), but depth outreach also includes the 
extent of lending in rural communities, to women, and lending through group loans (Bhatt and 
Tang, 2001). This paper gives characteristics of outreach measures, and provides explanations 
for mission drift using panel data regression estimations with the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) for average loan and logistic regressions for the other depth measures. The 
GMM methodology enables estimations without endogeneity bias, and, since we use a set of 
country variables in the instrument set, country effects are neutralized. 
Despite the interest that has been expressed in mission drift, few studies have been carried out 
to examine the issue, even fewer rigorous empirical studies. ”Since relatively few rigorous 
studies on the impact of microfinance have been completed, ideology tends to dominate’’ the 
debate on misson drift, a New Yorker article by Bruck (2006) runs. In this paper we intend to 
replace ideology with analysis. The ongoing debate and the lack of cross-country studies 
involving a large number of MFIs indicate a need for our study. We address mission drift 
explicitly using data from rated MFIs in 74 countries. 
We test three main hypotheses for mission drift derived from Freixas and 
Rochet (2008): profitability per customer, costs per customer, and customer risk. The first two 
hypotheses imply that an MFI will increase the size of its average loan in order to improve 
financial results, while risk is uncertain. The MFI may limit risk by making smaller loans, or by 
migrating to customers who are better off. The first strategy implies a smaller average loan size, 
the second a larger. 
The data set used to conduct this study includes observations of 379 MFIs in 74 countries 
collected by rating agencies during the years 2001 to 2008. Since the data were collected by 
third parties, they are more reliable than self-reported data. We find no evidence of mission 
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drift in the industry as a whole; however, panel data estimations using GMM reveal that the size 
of the average loan increases with increased average profit and average cost. These results 
imply that mission drift may occur if an MFI seeks higher financial returns, but that this effect 
is neutralized if the MFI is more cost efficient. These results confirm the Rhyne (1998) and 
Christen and Drake (2002) conjecture. Furthermore, we find that average cost is more important 
than average profit in determining average loan size. Though profit seeking leads to mission 
drift, attention should be given to reducing an MFI’s costs. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we describe our data on rated 
MFIs. In section 3, we discuss what we mean by mission drift and provide descriptive statistics. 
The aggregate data show no signs of mission drift. In section 4, we develop our theory and 
hypotheses. Section 5 provides an overview of the panel data methods used. The hypotheses are 
tested in section 6, and our conclusions are presented in section 7. 
 
2 Data 
Our study is based on observations of 379 rated MFIs in 74 countries. Third-party organizations 
established the standardized ratings, and outside organizations subsidized part of the costs 
involved (www.ratingfund.org). The main motive for an MFI to submit to a rating is improved 
access to external funding. The third-party and standardized MFI data collected from the rating 
agencies is judged to be better than self-reported data as found, for instance, in the Mixmarket 
database. The data set includes both financial and outreach data, and is thus well suited for 
studying the mission drift issue. 
At each rating, four years of data were commonly obtained, although some MFIs report five 
and six years of data. The rating agency obtains data for the current year as well as for 
immediately preceding years when visiting. The method of data collection means that the panel 
of data is highly balanced. This means that we have 1,159 observations for average loan and a 
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similar number for other variables in the analysis. The ratings were performed from 2001 to 
2008, which means that we have data from 1998 to 2008, with more than 100 observations for 
each year from 2001 to 2006. The variables used in the analysis are defined in table 1. 
Table 1 
The index number problems associated with country specific effects make comparisons 
between countries difficult (Deaton, 1995). We alleviate these problems by several procedures. 
First, we convert the monetary variables into USD at the going exchange rate, and then adjust 
them for purchasing power parity (PPP) bias based on IMF data. According to the purchasing 
power parity principle in international finance (Solnik and McLeavey, 2004) the first step 
means that country inflation rates are reflected in the exchange rate. However, conversion by 
market rates only is criticized for not taking account of the true purchasing power in the local 
market. The IMF’s GDP-PPP is an attempt to correct for this. By adjusting with this index, we 
make each loan (and each local cost) more comparable across nations. Second, we use country 
variables as instruments in the regressions. Third, panel data statistical methods, specifically the 
fixed effects method, remove time invariant and idiosyncratic differences from the data 
(Woolridge, 2002). 
 
3 Mission drift 
The average loan is the most commonly used indicator among microfinance investors and 
donors to measure the degree of MFI outreach to poor customer segments (Bhatt and Tang, 
2001; Cull et al., 2007; Schreiner, 2002). Mission drift occurs when the size of the average loan 
increases. This indicates that an MFI has moved into new customer segments, either because it 
begins to include customers who are better off or because existing clients experience success 
and are thus able to take on larger loans. In Schreiner (2002) average loan is one proxy for the 
depth dimension of outreach. Let us look at some others. 
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First, increasing the depth of outreach means reaching more women. Outreach to women has 
been a priority almost since the inception of Grameen bank (Dowla and Barua, 2006). Second, 
group lending has been the cornerstone of microfinancing. Instead of requiring formal 
collateral, loans are backed by peer groups (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Ghatak 
and Guinnane, 1999). Therefore, a shift from group lending to individual lending leads the MFI 
away from uncollateralized lending necessary to reach the poorest customers and may bring 
about mission drift and a reduction in the overall developmental impact stemming from group 
participation (Thorp et al., 2005). Third, reaching rural areas is a significant goal in 
microfinance, since this is where poverty is most concentrated (United Nations, 2006). When 
the relative weight of loan allocation shifts to the urban market, mission drift occurs. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the depth characteristics. 
Table 2  
The table shows that the average loan is less than USD 750, and the median is as low as USD 
332 in PPP-adjusted terms. Thus, the loans are on average small. The growth rate at the bottom 
of the table shows that the average loan in 2007 is smaller than the average loan in 1999. This 
may come about either because each individual MFI reduces the average loan, or because MFIs 
that have a higher proportion of smaller loans are rated late in the sample period. 
The lending methodology summarized in the ”Group’’ column shows that individual loans are 
the most common, but that group lending is increasing in the period. In fact, the average loan 
size is USD 1,134 for individual loans, USD 177 for village loans and USD 401 for the 
solidarity group. More group lending can be an explanation for the near constant average loan 
size in the period. The main market variable ”Rural’’ also shows an increase in depth outreach. 
However, the MFI’s gender bias is smaller, thus, the MFIs on average report a lower preference 
for female clients. All in all, the various measures do not add up to a confirmation of the 
mission drift hypothesis. 
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Let us look closer at the average loan. A mission drift for the individual MFI would be 
indicated if there were an increase in average loan size relative to the MFI’s starting year. Thus, 
older MFIs should service larger loans if mission drift is the case. We have removed average 
loans higher than USD 10,000 (PPP-adjusted) from the sample in order to prevent outliers 
influencing the average. This gives a loss of 9 observations out of 1,159 for average loan, or 0.8 
per cent of the sample. Figure 1 confirms findings in table 2. 
Figure 1  
Figure 1 depicts both the mean and the median average loan, so as to avoid the impact of a few 
high average loans in a given year. Both series show that average loan size does not increase 
with the MFI’s experience. Rather, the trend is downward over the years. Given that the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) records of the developing countries GDP per capita PPP-
adjusted shows an increase from USD 2,834 to USD 5,588 or 97.1 per cent in the period 1998 
to 2008, the non-rise of the average loan is even more remarkable. Replacing the average loan 
in figure 1 with the mean average loans for each MFI, we again obtain that average loan does 
not rise with MFI age. Thus, evidence from aggregate data cannot confirm the claim that as 
MFIs get older, they tend to drift from its original mission, thus leading to lower outreach. 
 
3 Mission drift: Theory and hypotheses  
We now develop hypotheses to explain the apparent lack of mission drift. The assumption is 
that all MFIs need to be financially sustainable in order to continue business. Thus, the decision 
to stay in an initial market segment or to allow a drift into a new segment is guided by 
consideration of profits. Thus, we may focus upon the MFI’s profit function alone. This also 
allows the severest test in favor of the mission drift argument. 
Disregarding governance issues, assume that an MFI is risk averse with an exponential utility 
function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p. 145)  𝑢 𝜋 = −𝑒−𝜌𝜋 , where 𝜋 is the MFI’s profits and 𝜌 
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is its measure of risk aversion. When profits are normally distributed, the expected utility of 
profits may be written: 
𝐸 𝑢 𝜋  = 𝑢  𝜋 −
1
2
𝜌𝜍2 = 𝑢 𝑃  
Here, 𝜍 is the risk of profits. Thus, in order to maximize expected utility, the MFI should 
maximize P. 
We need to specify P to arrive at an estimable function. As a first step, consider the bank’s 
profit function 𝜋 (Freixas and Rochet, 2008): 
𝜋 𝐷, 𝐿 =  𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟 𝐿 +  𝑟 1− 𝛼 − 𝑟𝐷 𝐷 − 𝐶 𝐷, 𝐿 , 
where 𝑟𝐿 is the rate of loans, 𝑟𝐷 is the rate of deposits, r is the rate on the interbank market, L is 
loans, D is deposits, 𝛼 is the percentage of deposits for compulsory reserves, and C(D,L) is the 
production function or management costs. The bank’s profit is the sum of the intermediation 
margins on loans and deposits, net of management costs. The risk of profits is composed of risk 
in the intermediation margins, changes in the demand for loans and supply of deposits, the 
repayment on loans, and management cost risk. For now, we assume that for an MFI the chief 
risk lies in repayment. 
Three arguments for this can be laid down. First, the MFI may be able to maintain near constant 
intermediation margins, even though the loan rate on the interbank market is variable. This is 
the case when the MFI is the sole provider of financial services in its area, and therefore, has 
some degree of monopoly power over customers. Then the MFI is able to control its own risk 
level (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p. 8991). Furthermore, relationship banking is a characteristic 
of microfinance. In such a setting, the customer becomes locked in with the bank (Sharpe, 
1990; Rajan, 1992; Mersland, 2009). The MFI has some power to fix deposit and lending rates, 
and is therefore able to neutralize changing rates on the interbank market. Second, an MFI’s 
management cost is primarily related to labor. These should be predictable and thus contain 
small risk. Third, repayment costs are likely to be risky even though microfinance observers 
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find that the poor repay their loans. MFIs try to minimize their losses by making small loans 
with short maturity terms; by making group loans, so that peers control each other; and by 
differentiating between individuals based on their reputations as their individual credit histories 
accumulate (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Nonetheless, repayment seems to be the chief risk 
element in microfinance, since an MFI is often unable to differentiate between good and bad 
risks and to monitor a client’s performance (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
The upshot is that only repayment risk remains, leaving us with: 
𝑃 =  𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟 𝐿 +  𝑟 1− 𝛼 − 𝑟𝐷 𝐷 − 𝐶 𝐷, 𝐿 −
1
2
𝜌𝜍2 𝐿 , 
where 1 2 𝜌 is a constant. We see that P is a risk-adjusted profit measure and assume that the 
management cost function is linear. By a simple rearrangement of the last equation and a 
division by the number of credit clients, CC, the average loan 𝐿  may be written: 
𝐿 =
1
𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟
𝑃
𝐶𝐶
−
𝑟 1− 𝛼 − 𝑟𝐷
𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟
𝐷
𝐶𝐶
+
1
𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟
𝐶(𝐷, 𝐿)
𝐶𝐶
+
1
2
𝜌𝜍2 𝐿  
The right-hand side shows (risk adjusted) profit, deposits, management costs, and loan risk per 
credit client. The model yields the predictions that average loan size will increase with higher 
profits, lower deposits, higher management costs, and higher risk per credit client. Notice that 
the intermediation margins are the same for average profit and average cost. If the signs are 
equal, but coefficients differ, either average profit or average cost will be the more important 
variable. Testing takes this last equation as the point of departure. However, it raises problems 
of endogeneity, which we address using instruments, see section 5. 
The prediction for risk indicates that higher risk per customer may lead to mission drift, since 
the bank may then favor higher loans to members of society who are better off. This is a 
mission drift hypothesis. However, a risk exposure argument would result in the opposite 
prediction. When risk per customer increases, one would expect MFIs to reduce the average 
loan size. After all, this is one of the ways any bank uses to limit risk exposure to particular 
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customers. This is a risk exposure hypothesis. Thus, the risk prediction in the last equation is 
not clear-cut. 
In addition to the model variables, an MFI’s time in business may induce it to accept smaller 
loan sizes. This time variable is important, since the mission drift argument implies that the 
older an MFI, the more it will drift towards higher income segments. Figure 1 demonstrates that 
the average loan size for all MFIs does not increase with MFI age. Two effects pulling in the 
same direction may be at work here. The first is a cost effect in which operating costs may drop 
over time as an MFI expends less effort to promote microloans and to ensure their repayment. 
The second effect stems from the fact that a repeat relationship with the same customer segment 
reveals its typical creditworthiness. An MFI may be willing to extend marginal and smaller 
loans deeper into a segment with a good record. The initial low-risk customers in a given 
segment may establish a good reputation, which benefits followers with lower loan demands. 
An experienced MFI is more likely than a novice to obtain such customer information and to 
risk lending to smaller customers. 
The hypotheses are summarized in table 3, together with descriptive statistics on variables that 
enter the analysis. 
Table 3  
As we have noted, average loans higher than USD 10,000 (PPP-adjusted) constitute 0.8 per cent 
of the sample. Since these outliers may influence regression results, they are removed in 
estimations. We use only the MFI’s assets as a control variable because the many country 
instruments (see section 5) will act as controls. 
McIntosh and Wydick (2005) suggest that increased competition among MFIs may lead to 
mission drift when cross-subsidiation of the weakest customers becomes less feasible. They 
assume that MFIs compete in a market with a fixed number of customers. However, the effects 
of competition is mediated through the profits. Thus, profits constitute the final step in the 
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argument leading to mission drift. This variable is already in our setup. Furthermore, the 
assumption of a fixed number of customers is clearly not realistic in the microfinance market. If 
anything, the rapid increase in the customer base is a characteristic of microfinance. In fact, in 
our sample the yearly growth rate of credit clients is 44.2 per cent in 875 observations. This 
growth gives hopes that the MFIs are able to achieve large scale advantages. Therefore, both 
profits and cost advantages are covered in our estimations. 
Table 4 shows the correlations between the explanatory variables. We include this table to 
facilitate a discussion of the potential multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
Table 4  
The table shows a number of significant bivariate correlations among the averages of our 
explanatory variables. For instance, average cost is significantly correlated to average profit and 
to firm size, measured as assets. However, these, and all other correlation coefficients, are 
rather low. Kennedy (2008, p. 196) notes that correlations need to be in the area of 0.8 to 0.9 to 
detect collinearity among two variables. None of the correlation coefficients in the table are in 
this range. 
 
5 Tests and methods  
We implement our estimates when average loan is the dependent variable and the independent 
variables’ hypotheses set out in table 3. In addition to the variables, the panel data includes a 
fixed effects error term together with a pure error term. The fixed effect, or time invariant, error 
term contains unobserved effects, such as the MFI’s “way of doing things”. We include country 
instruments in estimations, see below, which neutralize country effects. 
The same independent variables are used for the other mission drift variables, that is, lending 
methodology, main market, and gender bias. 
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Before we proceed to estimation we should check if panel data estimation is really necessary, or 
if the variations for each MFI are so small that pooled regressions suffice. An ANOVA test 
(Hsiao, 2003, ch. 2) reveals individual, time, and joint effects in our panel data. The ANOVA 
analysis uses the individual (i) and time (t) residuals of the pooled OLS regression. The 
ANOVA test is a test of whether the regression slopes are homogeneous for all individual MFIs 
at all times. The results of F tests of individual, time, and joint effects, show that all effects are 
significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting the homogeneity assumption across MFIs and time. 
The test indicates that a pooled OLS regression is inappropriate, and that we should use panel 
data estimation (Woolridge, 2002). 
A difficulty in estimation is that the profit, cost, and risk variables are determined 
simultaneously with average loan. Thus, the relation suffers from an endogeneity bias. The bias 
may be removed in the statistical sense if we can find a set of relevant instruments that are 
independent of the error term. We need at least as many instruments (L) as regressors (K) in 
order to identify the coefficients 𝛽𝑗 , (𝑗 = 1,⋯ ,5). Fortunately, panel data provide a wealth of 
opportunities for constructing instruments, far more than in a simple cross-sectional analysis 
(Deaton, 1995). We find instruments among country specific variables and the lagged 
explanatory variables. Since our choice results in the number of instruments exceeding the 
number of regressors 𝐿 > 𝐾, we have a set of overidentifying restrictions. The instruments’ 
independence of the error term is then tested with the Hansen (1982) J test which is distributed 
as 𝜒2(𝐿 − 𝐾), where (L-K) is the degrees of freedom. A high value indicates that at least some 
of the instruments are correlated with the error term, and thus, endogeneity in the statistical 
sense is not removed. 
We find instruments among country specific variables and the lagged explanatory variables for 
the estimation. The country variables are the IMF data on GDP per capita (adjusted for 
purchasing power parity), GDP growth, inflation, the current account balance as a percentage of 
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GDP, and finally, the overall Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom. For all these 
series, yearly records for the needed period from 1998 to 2008 are kept for nearly all countries. 
For new Balkan countries we use records for neighbors, if the country records are missing. The 
instruments will neutralize country specific effects, whether these are due to wealth level, 
growth, and risk. The economic freedom index includes measures for the individual’s freedom 
to enter into contracts (for instance, to invest), as well as measures for the government size and 
the country’s level of corruption. Thus it also contains important country institutional 
conditions in addition to the macroeconomic conditions from IMF. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business index is an alternative to the economic freedom index, however, the index starts only 
in 2004. 
The country instruments are generally weak. We supplement with lagged explanatory variables 
as instruments. This is possible because the independent variables are all simultaneous, and 
therefore, the lagged variables are unrelated to average loan. However, the lagged variables 
should be related to the explanatory variable. 
We perform estimations using the GMM estimator. With the optimal weighting matrix the 
GMM estimator allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial dependence when the number 
of MFIs N is large, and the number of time periods T is low (Woolridge, 2002, p. 193-4). This 
is fulfilled here, since we have 379 MFIs and 𝑇 = max𝑇 6. 
We use three different panel data methods, fixed effects, random effects, and first difference. 
The fixed-effects panel data estimation amounts to subtracting the individual MFI averages 
from the annual observation, and performing regression on these transformed variables. The 
procedure removes individual MFI heterogeneity, since fixed effects are assumed constant 
during the observation period. For instance, an MFI’s country identity is assumed fixed. Thus, 
the fixed effects are removed together with the constant. The random-effects estimation is 
performed by assuming that the fixed effect error is part of the error term. We implement this 
15 
 
by running first a generalized least squares (GLS) regression, obtain the variances, and use 
these for data transformation and final estimation with GMM. The first-difference estimation 
methodology involves the change in average loan due to change in profit per loan client and 
other variables. This means that the difference in average loan, 𝐿 𝑡 − 𝐿 𝑡−1, is regressed on 
similar differences in explanatory variables. Again, the fixed effects and the constant are 
removed. Together, the three panel data regressions should increase our faith in the results if 
their coefficients are similar and significant. 
 
6 Econometric evidence  
The estimation strategy is to first estimate our relation with average loan as the dependent 
variable using the three panel methods: fixed-effects, random-effects, and first-difference, and 
then to use the same explanatory variables for lending methodology, main market, and gender 
bias in logistic regressions. 
 
6.1 The average loan  
The country effect instruments GDP-PPP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP, and the economic freedom index are transformed, so that for 
instance in fixed effects estimations the instruments are demeaned. The explanatory variables 
making up the rest of the instruments are in original levels and lagged one period. Since we also 
use a constant as an instrument, this gives six overidentifying restrictions for fixed effects and 
first difference methods, and five for random effects. 
The results of estimating the regression for average loan are shown in table 5. 
Table 5 
Notice that a regression on standardized values (average zero and standard deviation equal to 
1.0 for all variables) is included. Disregarding this for the moment, we observe that average 
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profit and average cost are significant and equally signed in all panel data estimations. Thus, the 
results from the different panel data estimation methods are largely consistent, adding 
credibility to the results. Furthermore, the overall Wald statistics are very satisfactory, and the 
Hansen J statistic of overidentifying restrictions shows that instruments are not correlated with 
the error term. Thus, the instruments are relevant. 
Taking a closer look, we note that the profit per loan client is positive in the fixed and random-
effect panel data regressions, indicating that the average loan size increases with the profits per 
loan client. This result confirms the hypothesis of the relationship between average profit and 
average loan from the Freixas and Rochet (2008) model. Thus, an MFI is able to earn a larger 
absolute profit with a larger average loan size. This has the potential to support Yunus’s 
proposition that clients who are better off crowd out poorer clients in any credit scheme 
(Christen and Drake, 2002, p. 10). If an MFI demands higher profits per client, the poorest 
customers tend to be driven away. 
Table 5 also shows that the average loan size increases with costs per loan client in all 
regressions, confirming a further hypothesis based on the model developed by Freixas and 
Rochet (2008). Thus, inefficient MFIs need to shift their loan portfolios toward larger average 
loans. This means that inefficient MFIs are those most susceptible to mission drift. Another 
implication is that when an MFI increases its cost efficiency, it is better able to advance loans to 
the poorer members of the community. This result is in line with the observation made by 
Hishigsuren (2007) that the MFI in her case study increased lending to the poor, even when the 
time a lending officer spent with a borrowing group was cut in half. It also confirms the cost 
findings in Littlefield et al. (2003). 
Thus, average profit and average cost have a significant impact on average loan size. Which 
one is the most important? The regression with standardized values allows comparisons of 
importance. It shows that the economic effect of average cost is more important than average 
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profit. If an MFI is able to increase its average profit by one standard deviation, the size of the 
average loan will increase by about 54%, and will increase by about 85% with a similar change 
in average cost. Conversely, this also implies that when an MFI is run more efficiently, the MFI 
is able to reduce average loan size and prevent mission drift. If an MFI tends to increase cost 
efficiency more than average profit, we should not expect mission drift. 
The PaR30 risk hypothesis is uncertain, and the uncertainty is confirmed by no significant 
results in estimations. Thus, we cannot decide if the exposure effect of risk is stronger than the 
mission drift effect. For the MFI’s age the positive and significant result in table 5 means that 
when other variables are taken into consideration, the individual MFI tends to increase the 
average loan size with time. However, this result obtains in only one regression. 
In unreported regressions, we run several robustness checks. First, we test if the intermediation 
margin risk affects our estimates. A measure of such a risk is the inverse of the cost of funds 
divided by the portfolio yield. The higher this is the higher the risk. However, we find no effect 
from this measure. If we allow intermediation margin risk to enter, we should also check for its 
correlation with our preferred risk measure, PaR30. However, this is very low and not 
significant. We also calculated the Z risk measure (Berger et al., 2008) given by  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 +
𝐸𝑖/𝐴𝑖 /𝜍𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 , where the subscript denotes MFI number i, ROA is the return on assets, 𝜍𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 is 
its standard deviation, E is equity, and A is the MFI’s total assets. The lower is Z the higher its 
probability of default. Using this measure instead of or in addition to PaR30 did not bring any 
material changes to the regression results. The same applies to the risk measures debt-equity 
ratio and the ratio of voluntary savings to loans. Last, we use deposits instead of operational 
costs per loan client, and obtain essentially the same results for profits per loan client as those 
shown in table 5. The results for the other variables remain largely unperturbed. Thus, our 
regression results are robust to different variable specifications. 
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6.2 Leaving the group borrowers, the villages, and the women?  
If mission drift is the case among MFIs, one should expect MFIs to place less weight upon 
group lending, lending to rural customers, and to women. These alternative measures of the 
depth dimension in outreach (Schreiner, 2002) may provide further robustness tests of our 
results. 
We use logistic regressions in this section (Woolridge, 2002, p. 453...). The reason is that 
lending methodology, market, and gender bias are all categorical variables. For the two first, 
more than two categories exist. We convert these into indicator variables. For lending 
methodology this means that 1 signifies individual loan, and 0 other lending arrangements, such 
as group lending through a village bank. The MFI’s main market is 1 if it gives mainly to urban 
customers, 0 otherwise. These variables are time invariant, thus, an MFI is supposed to keep its 
characteristics as a lender to groups or rural customers throughout the four or five years for 
which we have observations. 
The time invariance places restrictions on the estimation techniques available. Fixed effects 
estimation is no longer possible, and random effects may be doubtful since it requires stringent 
assumptions. We decide to pool the data, add the country instruments as control variables, and 
furthermore, to include year dummy variables in regressions. Moreover, correcting for 
endogeneity is difficult in binary choice models (Woolridge, 2002, p. 490). Accordingly, we 
estimate without instruments. Since the new depth measures do not follow from the original 
relation, it is not certain that endogeneity corrections should be made. 
The results from the pooled logistic regression are set out in table 6. 
Table 6 
The table confirms the result for average loan in the former section. In particular, average cost 
turns out to be significant for all three variables and has the same sign as in average cost 
regressions. Thus, higher average cost will induce the MFI to seek more individual customers, 
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customers in urban communities, and to focus less on female customers. The reverse of this is 
of course that to the extent that the MFI is able to keep costs down, it is able to serve group, 
rural, and female borrowers. Furthermore, the average profit is significant for lending 
methodology only, thus confirming the weaker result for average profit than average cost in 
table 5. In these new regression we find risk is significant two times. Thus, a higher repayment 
risk means that MFIs lend more to individuals and assume lower bias for female customers. 
We perform logistic regressions with random effects panel data and with the average values for 
each MFI as simple robustness tests. In both, the country variables are kept as instruments, but 
year indicator variables are dropped. Except for main market, the results in both types of 
estimation parallel those in table 5. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Some commentators fear that as microfinance is becoming more ”commercialized’’, the 
microfinance institution (MFI) will drift away from its original goal of providing financial 
services to the poor. ”The Yunus faction worries about ”mission drift’’, saying that, as the drive 
for profitability increases, only the so-called ”less poor’’ (as opposed to the very poor) will 
qualify for loans’’ says Bruck (2006). On the other hand, Rhyne (1998) and Christen and Drake 
(2002)hold that the profit motive leads MFIs to seek out new markets and to be more efficient. 
We are able to enlighten the debate using data from rated MFIs in 74 countries for the period 
from 1998 to 2008, supplying both descriptive and econometric evidence from panel data 
estimations on mission drift. 
Our main conclusion is that we cannot find evidence of mission drift. This is in line with the 
Rhyne (1998) and Christen and Drake (2002) conjecture that profits and costs may outweigh 
each other and thus not lead to mission drift or lower outreach. Building upon a bank profit 
function framework (Freixas and Rochet, 2008) we hypothesize that profit per credit client is 
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correlated with average loan amount. The econometric evidence supports this hypothesis as 
general methods of moment (GMM) estimations with panel data methods and instruments show 
that average loan size increases with an increase in average profits and average operational 
costs. The impact of MFI risk upon the size of the average loan is undecided. Furthermore, 
logistic regressions with lending methodology (group or individual), main market (rural or 
urban), and gender bias support the findings for average loan. Together with the descriptive 
evidence, this shows that the MFIs tend to maintain and even increase the depth outreach of 
average loan. These results confirm the findings of the few prior studies that have focused on 
mission drift (Littlefield et al., 2003; Cull et al., 2007; Hishigsuren, 2007), and they repel the 
Yunus worry, perhaps because Yunus reasons in a static framework, whereas the dynamism in 
MFIs’ cost reductions countervails the tendency for higher average loan. 
Thus, the more cost effective an MFI is, the smaller the average loan. A prediction can thus be 
made that further efforts to reduce costs will result in MFIs reaching out to even poorer 
segments, when profitability is at the same level. Rather than concentrating on an MFI’s 
”commercialization,’’ attention should be focused on how to reduce costs per client. Since the 
microfinance industry is still young and growing strongly, there should be room for cost 
reductions in the future. Better management may provide MFIs with good economic reasons to 
stay in the poorer customer segment. 
By using average loan as our main outreach variable we follow common practice among 
researchers (Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Cull et al., 2007; Schreiner, 2002) as well as practitioners, 
investors, and donors. There are however weaknesses in using an average value. Our alternative 
measurements individual loan, female clients and rural market are thus important to include. 
We also welcome other mission drift studies using other data and alternative outreach 
measurements such as for instance percentage of MFI-clients below a PPP defined threshold or 
average loan for new customers. 
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There is a need for more efficiency studies to better understand cost drivers in MFIs. It is 
possible that specialized, credit-only MFIs, or partnerships with regular banks to facilitate 
savings mobilization, are more customer-friendly strategies than the current recommendation 
urging MFIs to become fully fledged banks (Helms, 2006). Furthermore, there is a need for 
rigorous studies of the several MFIs that have transformed from being non-profit to becoming 
for-profit. Have these left their mission to serve the poor? We hope to address these issues in 
future studies. 
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Figure 1: Average and median USD loan size distributed by MFI age. The loans are GDP per 
capita PPP-adjusted. Years with fewer than 10 observations are disregarded. Average loan size 
is capped from above at USD 10,000. The total number of firm-year observations is 1,150. 
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Table 1: Definitions of variables used in descriptions and analysis 
Name Definition 
Average loan (Total value of loans)/(# credit clients)  
Main market   Lending to customer in mainly rural, urban or a both communities 
Lending methodology   Lending to groups or to individuals 
Conscious gender bias A dummy variable which is 1 if an MFI has a bias towards lending to women 
Average profit (Net annual result)/(# credit clients) 
Average operational 
cost (Total operational costs)/(# credit clients) 
PaR30 The fraction of the loan portfolio that is 30 days or more overdue 
MFI age The years since an MFI started microfinance operations 
Assets The size of an MFI's assets  
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Table 2: Depth outreach characteristics on average MFI 
 
Avg.loan Group Rural Gender 
Mean 747.4 2.322 2.123 0.441  
Median 332.3 3 2 0  
Standard Deviation 1318.1 0.807 0.848 0.497 
Minimum 18.3 1 1 0 
Maximum 14663 4 4 1 
Observations 371 358 367 372 
Growth 99-07 (%) -2.2 -3.3 9.5 -35 
“Group” is shorthand for lending methodology. The variable is coded as 1 for village loan, 2 for solidarity group, and 3 for 
individual loans. 4 is an “other” category. “Rural” is shorthand for the MFI's main market, 1 being urban, 2 rural, and 3 a blend 
of the two. Again 4 is an “other” category. “Gender” is shorthand for the MFI's gender bias, being either 0 (“no”) or 1 (“yes”). 
 
The last line indicates growth rates in the variables. The percentage growth is between 1999 to 2007, but from 2001 for 
Gender. Years with fewer than 10 observations are excluded. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables entering the analysis and their hypotheses 
Series Mean Std Min Max Obs H 
Average profit 25.997 183.276 -1076.860 3224.680 1158 + 
Average cost 161.476 224.576 0.000 2123.040 1161 + 
PaR30 0.067 0.099 0.000 0.973 1142 +/- 
MFI age 8.912 6.970 0 79 1509 - 
Assets  10500 28300 0 409000 1209 
  
For definitions of variables, see table 2. “H” stands for the hypothesis in the analysis. A + sign means that the variable is 
supposed to be positively associated with the average loan size. 
Assets are divided by USD 1,000. 
All monetary variables are GDP per capital PPP-adjusted. 
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables based on their case averages 
 
Profit Cost Risk Age 
Cost 0.4961 
   Risk -0.133 0.102 
  Age 0.0075 -0.052 0.1931 
 Size 0.1225 0.1375 0.029 0.1325 
 
Raised number: The two-sided Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the number’s level. For instance, the correlation 
0.4961 is significant at the 1% level. 
All monetary values are adjusted by the purchasing power parity GDP per capita obtained from IMF. “Profit” and “Cost” are 
averages per credit client. “Risk” is the PaR30 risk measure and “Size” is the MFI's assets. 
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Table 5: Are average profit, cost, and risk related to the MFI's average loan size? 
 
Fixed effects Random First 
 
Unstandardized Standardized effects difference 
Constant 
  
-0.133 
 Average profit 3.032* 0.537* 5.756** 1.180 
Average cost 3.870** 0.851** 4.050** 2.826*** 
PaR30 2.733 0.269 0.554 0.783 
MFI age 0.021 0.147 0.009 0.040*** 
Assets 0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.001  
Wald (F) test sign. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J test 0.771 0.771 0.936 0.802 
N (Firm years) 741 741 741 736 
 
The average loan size in rated microfinance institutions (MFI) regressed on profit function variables, risk, and control variables 
using different panel data methods. Data are from 1998 to 2008. The estimation is undertaken with the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) methodology using an optimal weighting matrix and robust standard errors (Woolridge, 2002). In the 
standardized regression the variables have zero average and standard deviation equal to 1.0. 
Average loan is defined as the total value of outstanding loans divided by the number of credit clients. Average profit is the net 
annual result divided by the number of credit clients. Average cost is the total operating costs divided by the number of credit 
clients. PaR30 is portfolio at risk, that is, loans that are 30 days or more overdue as a fraction of total loans. MFI age is the 
number of years of microfinance experience. Assets are the total assets at the end of the year. All monetary variables are GDP 
per capita PPP adjusted with numbers from IMF, using the developing countries average GDP-PPP per capita as a benchmark. 
Average loan includes MFIs with average loans less than USD 10,000 (PPP-adjusted). 
The instruments include the country variables GDP per capita (GDP-PPP adjusted), GDP growth, inflation, the current account 
balance as a per cent of GDP, and an economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. Furthermore, the one period 
lagged explanatory variables are also instruments. 
A raised * means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** means significance at the 5% level, and *** means 1% 
significance level. 
The Wald F test is an exclusion test of the hypothesis that all coefficients together are equal to zero (Greene, 2003 p. 107). A 
low significance value rejects the hypothesis. The Hansen (1982) J test is a test that the instruments are independent of the 
error term in the regression. A low significance level rejects independence. 
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Tab le 6: Are the MFI's lending methodology, its main market, and its gender bias related to average profit, cost, risk, the MFI's 
age, and its size? 
 
Lending Main Gender  
 
methodology Market bias   
Average profits 0.002** 0.000 -0.001  
Average costs 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 
Risk 4.513*** 0.089 -2.181*** 
MFI age 0.024* -0.025*** 0.006  
Assets 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 
Pseudo 𝑅2  0.153 0.095 0.095  
LR test (sign.) 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Observations 1015 1033 1040 
 
Lending methodology is 1 if lending is mainly to individual, zero otherwise. Main market is 1 if lending is mainly to urban 
customers, 0 otherwise. Gender bias is 1 if the MFI has an explicit policy to target female customers. 
Maximum likelihood estimation with logistic specifications on pooled data 1998 to 2008. Regressions include the country 
specific variables GDP per capita (GDP-PPP adjusted), GDP growth, inflation, the current account balance as a per cent of 
GDP, an economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation; and year indicator variables. 
A raised * means that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level; ** means significance at the 5% level, and *** means 1% 
significance level. 
The LR test is an exclusion test of the hypothesis that all coefficients together are equal to zero (Greene, 2003 p. 107). A low 
significance value rejects the hypothesis. 
 
